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THE USE OF MORTALITY TABLES.
KINDS OF TABLES.
Various tables have been in use for insurance purposes. The
early English companies relied chiefly on tables prepared by Hal-
ley,1693, by Siissmilch,1741,1 by De Parcieux and others.2 Subse-
quently the Northampton Table came into general use. It
was constructed by Dr. Thomas Price, from the registers left in
the parish of All Souls, Northampton, England, for the 46 years,
1735 to 1780. "For a long time however," says G. M. Low, Actu-
ary, "this table occupied a foremost place as a base for life
contingency calculations of all kinds, and even after the intro-
duction of other tables, which are now recognized as more accu-
rate, it continued to receive a large share of popularity. The
rates of many asurance offices of high standing were calculated
from it, and until a comparatively recent date [prior to 1881] it
remained in use by not a few of them." 3
THE CARLIS1,E TABLE.
The Carlisle Table was constructed by Mr. Joshua Milne
from materials furnished by the labors of Dr. John Heysham.
These materials comprised two enumerations of the population of
'11 Internat. Encyc. 259.
'13 Encyc. Brit. 169.
'13 Encyc. Brit. 169. In Rundel v. Electric St. Rway Co. 33 Super.
233, Trexler, J. told the jury that the Carlisle tables were "based upon
the experience of insurance companies." This was incorrect; but the
instructions to the jury as to the use to be made of them, was thought
to be substantially correct.
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the parishes of St Mary and St Cuthbert, Carlisle [England] in
1780 and 1787 (the numbers in the former year having been 7677
and in the latter 8677) and the abridged bills of mortality of these
parishes for the nine years 1779 to 1787, during which period the
total number of deaths was 1840. TIhese were very limited data
upon which to found a mortality table, but they were manipulated
with great care and fidelity. The close agreement of the Carlisle
Table with other observations, and especially its agreement in a
general sense, with the experience of assurance companies, won for
it a large degree of favor. No other mortality table has been so
extensively employed in the construction of auxiliary tables of
all kinds, for computing the values of benefits depending upon
human life. Besides those furnished by Mr. Milne, elaborate
and useful tables based upon the Carlisle data have been con-
structed by David Jones, W. T. Thomson, Chisholm, Sang and
others. The graduation of the Carlisle Table is however, very
faulty, and anomalous results appear in the death-rates at cer-
tain ages.4  "The Carlisle Table is still used by some English
Companies. '
TABLES BASED ON SELECTED LIVES.
The tables heretofore referred to, were based "on the life
experience of the general population, '" 6 that-is, upon the observa-
tion of the length of time that persons of certain ages lived be-
yond these ages, irrespective of their health, at these ages, their
avocations, their habits, their exposedness to conditions tending
to shorten or prolong life. The habit for a long time of insurance
companies has been to insure only those who are exempt from
certain diseases, or from liability, on account of certain vocations,
habits, etc. to a shortening of life. "The Carlisle Table," con-
cluded Paxson, C. J. from the description in the Britannica, of
the method of its formation "is based upon general population,
and not upon selected or insurable lives." 7 The statement of
Latimer, J. in his charge to the jury; is hence inaccurate that
"The Carlisle tables are based upon the mortality experience of
insurance companies."" When the insurance companies began
to limit their risks to persons exempt from certain diseases, or not
'13 Encyc. Brit. 169.
'11 Internat. Encyc. 260.
'11 Internat. Encyc. 260.
SSteinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504
• Caibell v. City of York, 172 Pa. 205.
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pursuing certain especially hazardous businesses9 they began to
acquire experience of the number of years that the assured persons
lived beyond their ages at the time of the insurance, that is, of
the length of life, after the insurance, of these selected persons.
The experience of the Equitable Assurance Society, the pioneer
of the modern system of insurance, has formed the basis of sev-
eral tables. Two such, founded thereon, have been used to a
considerable extent, by insurance companies, one computed by
Davies and published in 1825, and another constructed by Morgan
from the statistics of membership of the society from its com-
mencement in 1762 down to 1829, and published in 1834.10 Later
17 insurance companies contributed their statistics, embracing
in all 83,905 policies, of which 44,877 were in existence at the
time of giving in the returns, 25,247had been discontinued, and
13,781 had fallen by the death of the assured. Upon the data
thus obtained, a table known as the Seventeen Offices' Experience
Table, was composed and published in 1843 which came to be
used to a considerable extent by insurance companies."' "It is
still used" says the New International E~cyclopedia,2 "by many
English companies, and is the authorized table for the calculation
of reserves in most American States."
TABLES USED IN AMERICAN STATES.
The early American offices adopted English tables, first the
Northampton, then the Carlisle, and later the Combined Exper-
ience, ie. the Seventeen Offices' Experience Table. Meantime
several tables based on American experience have been worked
out, but none of them has come into general use except the so-
called American Experience Table, constructed by Mr Homans
from the experience of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York. At-the present time the two tables in general use
among insurance offices in the United States, and authorized by
the insurance department of the various states for the calculation
of reserves, are the English Combined Experience Table, [the
'In Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466 the effort was made
to show that one engaged as a slave-catcher, or as a locomotive engineer,
would not be insured.
"013 Encyc. Brit. 169.
113 Encyc. Brit. 169.
'
2Vol. II, p. 260. Names given to these tables are the Actuaries' Table;
The Combined Experience Table, and the Seventeen Offices' Table.
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Seventeen Offices' Experience table, supra] and the American
Experience table.
IMPERFECTIONS OF THE TABLES.
The tables made by the insurance companies, e.g. the Com-
bined Experience [Seventeen Offices' Experience] and the Amer-
ican Experience table are known to be favorable to the insurance
companies, that is, to indicate a higher death-rate than actually
prevails and neither of them makes any attempt to classify risks
according to any other factor than the age of the insured. More-
over, the numbers for the advanced ages are based almost entirely
on a priori principles and not on actual observation, since histor-
ical data for these ages are very incomplete. 13 In one case, it
was said not to be error, of which the defendant could complain,
for the plaintiff to put in evidence annuity tables because, being
made for the purpose of life insurance, "they fall short in most in-
stances, of the actual duration of human life."' 4
THE TABLES USED.
If the table is based upon the observation of the lives of
all classes without discrimination, as respects health, avocation,
habits, place and circumstances of residence, etc., it is admissible
in any case; yet it is evident that if the person whose life is in
question is sicklier, feebler than the majority of men whose lives
have furnished the data for the table, he will probably live less
long than the average indicated by the table. If that person has
better than the average physique he will probably live longer than
the average age. This probable deviation from the average is no
reason for excluding the table which furnishes that average.
In Steinbrunner v. Railway Co.' 5 Paxson, C.J. lays down the
principle that if the table is based on selected lives, that is ,on
lives that are insurable, "it would be of value only for life-insur-
ance purposes, and utterly useless to apply to unselected lives or
lives generally." He justifies the use of the Carlisle Table, in a
case in which a widow sued a railroad company for the killing
of her husband, by satisfying himself that that table was not
based on selected lives. Yet the evidence apparently indicated
that Steinbrunner was "an ordinarily healthy, strong man," so
'11 New Internat. Encyc. 260.
"Mulcairns v. Janesville, (Wis.) 29 N. W. 565.
1146 Pa. 504. The use of the Carlisle Table is again approved in
McCue v. Knoxville Borough, 146 Pa. 580.
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that, even had the table been based on observations of the lives
of healthy, strong men, it ought to have been receivable. It can
matter little, whether a man is examined by a physician, and
reported by him to be found to be sound, or whether his soundness
is proved in court. The physicians who examine are of unequal
skill, and care and conscientiousness. They are unknown to the
court. The reliability of their examination is not exposed by
cross-examination. It is said by Dean, J.16 that without evidence
that the deceased was of good health, even the Carlisle table
"'can have but little weight."
OTHER THAN CARLISLE TABLE.
Despite the intimations of Steinbrunner v. Railway Com-
pany, to the contrary, it is probable that even the tables founded
on observations of lives that have been selected for insurance,
and have been actually insured, are admissible, if they are accom-
panied by evidence that the person in question was in such health,
was pursuing such vocations, had such habits, as that he would
have been accepted by insurance companies. In Kerrigan v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,17 a case in which damages for personal
injuries were sought, both the Carlisle Table and certain tables
made up "by actuaries of reputable insurance companies" were
put in evidence. Of the latter tables, Dean, J. says "we have no
doubt they furnish a fair expectation of life, in the selected
lives on which they are based. There was scarcely any proof of
facts which brought plaintiff within this class of selected lives
* * * * The tables were not entitled to such weight [i.e. to be as-
sumed as establishing the plaintiff's expectancy] unless, by prece-
dent proof he had brought himself clearly within the class of
selected lives tabulated, and this he had failed to do," i.e. he had
not proved his habits or health. Probably, therefore, even the
Combined Experience Table, and the American Experience
Table, or some other table founded on selected lives, may be
used, if the person in question has been insured by a reputable
company, about the time of the accident or death, or if he is
shown at that time to have been of such health as to have made
him insurable. While Paxson, C. J. says that a table based on
insurable lives, would be "utterly useless" if applied to "un-
selected lives, or lives generally" evidence that the decedent, or
"Kerrigan v. Penna. R. R. 194 Pa. 98.
7194 Pa. 98.
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the person injured was healthy and strong, at once selects him,
and may put him in the class of insurables. The same physician
that, had he applied for insurance, would have examined him,
may testify in court to his physical soundness. It would be
hazardous, therefore to say that only the Northampton Table or
the Carlisle Table or some other table founded on an undiscrim-
inating observation may be used. In the large majority of cases,
the Carlisle Table has been used 18 but sometimes a table computed
for insurance purposes has also been used."9 In some cases, ap-
parently without error, the only tables employed have been "mor-
tality tables in common use by insurance companies of this
country ' 20 the "American Tables of mortality." 21, In McKenna
v. 'Citizens' Natural Gas Company2 2 a witness testified to the
life expectancy of the plaintiff from a life table, called the "Com-
bined Actuaries' Experience" table. This was held erroneous.
It is remarked by the court that it did not appear how the table
had been constructed; whether it was founded on selected, insur-
able lives, or upon general population. It did appear that the
table was used for "ascertaining rates." In this state of the evi-
dence, the reception of the table would have been error. It was
error to receive the testimony of the witness based upon the table.
There is no case in Pennsylvania, in which the Northampton
Table has been employed, although it has been in use in some
other states.22  There does not seem to have been any objection in
'Emery v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 492; Rummele v. Allegheny Heating
Co., 2 Mona. 98; Iseminger v. Water & Power Co., 209 Pa. 615; Seifred
v. Pa. R. R. 260 Pa. 399. Cf. Shippen's Appeal, 80 Pa. 391.
"Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504. The Carlisle Table made
the expectancy of a man at 46 years of age 23.81 years and the American
Table almost exactly the same, viz. 23.8 years. Kerrigan v. Penna. R. R.
194 Pa. 98.
"Campbell v. City of York 172 Pa. 205; [It does not appear whether
evidence of the good health of the plaintiff prior to the accident, was
offered or not. It was unavailingly objected that the accident had
itself reduced the expectancy.]
'Knaut v. Frankford etc. Rway., 160 Pa. 327. The expectancy "ac-
cording to the tables of mortality" was shown in Bunting v. Hogsett,
139 Pa. 363.
'198 Pa. 31.
'Sauter v. R. R. Co. 66 N. Y. 50; Hinsdale v. R. R. 81 N. Y. Supp.
356; Wagner v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. 554; Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592;
Hunn v. Michigan Central R. R. 44 N.W. 502.
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several states, to the use not merely of the Carlisle Table,24
but even of tables constructed upon data furnished by insurance
companies.
2
5
PROOF OF TABLES.
The supreme court instructing itself from the Encyclopedia
Britannica, has taken judicial notice of the method by which the
Carlisle Table was prepared, and has affirmed its admissibility :2-
Whether any printed table purporting to be, or alleged to be, the
Carlisle Table, is in fact a correct copy of such, 27 possibly the
court takes judicial notice.2 1 It has in no case insisted on proof.
The court, apparently does not take judicial notice of the accuracy
of the "Combined Actuaries' Experience" table, for it has insisted
on evidence as to the material from which it was constructed;
on evidence whether it was founded on insurable lives or on
general population.
2 9
MUST THE TABLES BE PUT IN EVIDENCE?
Sometimes printed tables purporting to be the Carlisle, or the
American Experience, or some other accredited table, are put in
evidence. Sometimes a witness, having before him the table, or
having consulted it previously, is interrogated concerning the
expectancy disclosed by it. In Steinbrunner v. Railway Co. 0
a life insurance agent, having stated that Wylie's, and Hohman's
tables were in general use, that Wylie's have been published for
2 Nelson v. Lake Shore etc. R. R. (Mich.) 62 N.W. 993. The plaintiff
used the American Mortality tables, and the defendant the Carlisle table.
Also, Walters v. R. R. Co. 41 Ia. 71; Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304; 2
N.W. 715 ;King v. Bell, (Neb.) 14 N.W. 141 and many others.
'Mary Lee Coal Co. v. Chambliss (Ala.) 11 So. 897; Gulf etc. R. R.
v. Johnson, (Texas) 31 S.W. 255; Mulcairns v. City of Janesville, (Wis.)
29 N.W. 565; The Dauntless, 121 Fed. 420; Nelson v. Lake Shore R. R.
(Mich.) 62 N.W. 993; Alexander v. Bradley, 66 Ky. 667.
2
'Steinbrunner v. R. R. 146 Pa. 504. The witness said that the Carlisle
tables were based on selected lives in the city of Carlisle, but the court
concluded otherwise.
"A copy found in Scribner on Dower was used in Kerrigan v. Penna.
R. R., 194 Pa. 98.
'Knott v. Peterson, (Iowa) 125 Ia. 404; Scheffler v. Minneapolis etc.
R. R. (Minn.) 21 N.W. 711; City of Lincoln v. Power, 151 W.S. 436;
Carlisle table as found in Encyclopedia Britannica, was held admissible
"without preliminary proof." Pearl v. Omaha etc. R. R. 88 N.W. 1078. (Ja.).
'McKenna v. Gas Co., 198 Pa. 31.
:'146 Pa. 504.
8 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
many years and are used by all the life insurance companies,
and that he had the tables with him, was asked to state [but not
to consult the table and then state] what the expectation of a man
of 46 years of age was. The tables were, seemingly, not put in
evidence. In McCue v. Knoxville Borough,3 ' a physician and
surgeon, having tesfified about the injuries of the plaintiff, was
allowed to answer the question as to the expectancy of life of a
healthy man, of plaintiff's age, from the mortality tables, viz
"the Carlisle Tables." He said that the expectation according to
the tables was about 21 years. A life insurance agent testified
from what purported to be the "Combined Actuaries' Experience
Table." The table itself was not offered. It was.said by Mestrezat,
J. that "The competency of the witness and the weight of his
testimony depended entirely upon the value of th6 table as evi-
dence to establish the expectancy of life. Had the table itself
been offered, under the facts disclosed at the trial, it would have
been rejected. '3 2
CASES IN WHICH LIFE EXPECTANCY MAY BE RELEVANT.
PERSONAL INJURY.
An injury to a man's body, while not killing him, may
affect his earning power. The pecuniary loss involved in the re-
duction of his earning power depends in part, upon the length of
his life. If he dies ten years after and his earnings are reduced,
annually $500, he will throughout his life, suffer the loss of
.$5000. If he lives 20 years, other things being equal, his loss
would be twice as great., Hence if only one action is allowed
him, for the injury, and in that action his whole damage must
be assessed it becomes necessary to forecast his life, and to
learn how long he will probably live. Hence in actions for per-
sonal injuries, the plaintiff may show what his expectancy of
life is, and he may employ the appropriate table, in order to do
SO.3 The effect of the injury may be not merely to lessen the
working power, but to shorten the life. Apparently, the plaintiff
may recover for the diminished earning power through what
"146 Pa. 508. It does not appear that the table was offered.
'McKenna v. Gas Co., 198 Pa. 31.
'Campbell v. City of York, 172 Pa. 205; Kraut v. Railway, 160 Pa.
328; McCue v. Knoxville Borough 146 Pa. 580; Dooner v. Canal Co.,
164 Pa. 17; Rummele v. Allegheny Heating Co. 2 Mona 98; McKenna
v. Gas Co., 198 Pa 131; Iseminger v. Water & Power Co., 209 Pa. 615;
Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363; Seifred v. Pa. R. R. 206 Pa. 399.
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would have been his life if he had not suffered the accident.
Hence the expectancy at the time immediately preceding it, is
sought after. The expectation of a healthy man 34 is sought
after. The injury tending to shorten his life, and even to result
in sudden death, the expectancy of life prior to it was neverthe-
less relevant . 3  Apparently then the plaintiff may recover the
present worth of the probable results of his earnings during a
number of years after his death, that death having been hastened
by the injury.
COMPENSATION FOR DEATH.
The death of a husband, or son, or father, may cause
prectiniary loss to the wife, or father or mother, or son or
daughter. The amount of that loss will depend in part on what
would have been the duration of the deceased's life, had the
fatal injury not been inflicted upon him. What would have been
this duration is a matter of conjecture, an aid to which is a
knowledge of the length of the period over which men who
have already reached the age of the deceased on the average
continue to live. This average, and the tables that manifest it
may therefore be considered in actions founded on death."8 As
the plaintiff would annually have received benefits measurable
in money, from the deceased only during his, the plaintiff's life; as
well as only during the decedent's life , it would seem evident
that if in the action the present worth of the benefits is to be
recovered some evidence of the probable longevity of the plaintiff
is as necessary as that of the longevity of the deceased. X was
killed by a steamboat -collision when he was 21 years old. His
life expectancy was 272 years. Those dependent upon him
were, his mother, 72 years old, his father, 73 years old, and a
sister, 22 years old. The admiralty court considered the life
expectancy of the father, mother and sister, who had spinal
disease.3 7 A son aged 27 years was killed. The father was at
the. trial 53 years old. It was necessary to consider the father's
expectancy, viz 17 years, in order to learn the damages to which
he was entitled.38 In an action by a widow for the killing of her
"
4McCue v. Knoxville Borough, 146 Pa. 580. Cf. Bunting v. Hogsett,
139 Pa. 363.
'Campbell v. City of York, 172 Pa 205.
"Steinbrunner v. R. R. Co., 146 Pa. 504; Emery v. Philadelphia 208
Pa. 492; McKenna v. Gas Co., 198 Pa. 31.
'The Dauntless, 121 Fed. 420.
'Galveston etc. R. R. Co. v. Leonard, (Texas) 29 S.W. 954.
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husband by furnishing him intoxicants, it was held proper, not
merely to discover his expectancy but hers also.39 The act of
April 26th 1855, stating that persons entitled to recover, for the
death of another, are the husband, the widow, the children, or
parents, and no other relative, directs that the sum shall go to
them in the proportion they would take his or her personal es-
tate in case of intestacy. In Emery v. Philadelphia, 40 an action
by the widow, although it did not appear that there were any
children, and that therefore any damages, other than to the
widow, were recoverable, it was held that the probable length of
life of the widow was irrelevant. The reasons assigned are not
convirrcing. (a) The doctrine that the lenkth of the widow's life
is relevant, has not appeared tenable to the professional mind.
But surely since every point is made for the first time, much
weight cannot be given to the fact that it was not made before.
(b) C. J. Mitchell concedes that the widow is "entitled now to
compensation for what she has lost by her husband's death."
But how has she lost the earnings her husband would, had he-
not been killed, have made, after her own death?
PRESENT WORTH OF A LIFE ESTATE.
It may become necessary to ascertain the present worth of an
annuity, or of a life estate, whether in personalty or realty.
Dean, J. said, in Kerrigan v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.41 that
he could see how, from a mortality table "the present worth of
a widow's dower can be computed. Hers is a fixed annual pay-
ment, affected not by age, health or ability to earn, but only by her
death. Her age being known and her probable longevity being
shown by the table no other fact is necessary." If the value of a
dower could be computed by means of the table, there is no
apparent reason for disputing the computability by the same
means, of the present worth of a curtesy. A curtesy is the
right to receive the rents and profits of the land for one's life.
These rents and profits will vary directly with the length of fife.
'Hall v. Germain 14 N. Y. Supp. 5. So in action for death of husband
in a railroad accident; B. & 0. R. R. v. State, 33 Md. 542; Cf. Baltimore
etc. Turnpike Co. v. State, 71 Md. 573. The probable length of the
widow's life must be considered; Jones v. McMullan, 88 N.W. 207 (Mich.)
As to likelihood of widow's remarriage, see Rafferty v. Buckman,
46 Ia. 195.
"208 Pa. 492.
'194 Pa. 98.
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Yet in Shippen's Appeal 2 the court refused to concede that
the present worth of a curtesy could be ascertained by an estimate
of the probable length of the life. It adopted the rule that a life
estate, any life estate, is worth one third of the fee The life
estate of X, when he is 20 years old, is worth no more than it is
when X has become 90 years of age. Allowing that insurance
companies may usefully employ mortality tables in determining
whether to accept certain risks, and at what rates of premium
to accept them, the court says, "But an individual case depends
on its own circumstances, and relative rights of the life tenant
and remainderman are to be ascertained accordingly. A con-
sumptive or diseased man does not stand on the same plane as one
of the same age in vigorous health. Their expectations of life
differ in point of fact," an excellent reason for a conclusion
diametrically opposite to that reached by the court. If the value
of the earning power of a man, dependent as it is, in part, upon
his length of life, may be ascertained.by reference to the average
ages of men, and the appropriate tables, why is not the value of
the earning power of a piece of land, during X's life, to be
ascertained in a similar way?
IN DETERMINING INSURABLE INTERESTS.
The rule has been laid down in Ulrich v. Reinoehl,4 3 that
when a creditor insures the life of his debtor, the policy may
provide for the payment of a sum of money that shall
equal the debt, plus the interest upon it for the period of the
debtor's life expectancy, and the sum of the premiums that will be
payable during that period, plus the interest thereon. The use
of this rule compels the ascertainment of the period of ex-
pectancy, and, in ascertaining it, resort may be had to the
Carlisle Tables.
UNRELIABILITY OF THE TABLE.
In various inquiries, it becomes important to know how long
a person, who has died from a certain cause, e.g. a railroad acci-
dent, the excessive potation of intoxicating liquor, etc., would
have lived but for that accident; that potation, etc.; or how
long a person who has suffered a bodily injury, will survive it.
'80 Pa. 391. The court refused to consider the expectancy as exhib-
ited by the Carlisle tables.
'143 Pa. 238. Cf. Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618; Cooper v. Shaeffer, 20
W.N. 123. Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223.
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The future is impervious to human sight, and guesses are made
as to the probable longevity of a given man, from past experiences
of the longevity of men more or less similarly situated with
respect to age, occupation, habits, freedom from disease, etc.
If we had observed that all men 46 years of age, and then in
good health, or even that the majority of them id lived 23.8
longer, we would have reason to expect X, now 46 to live 23.8
years longer, or that Y, who was killed at 46, would have lived
23.8 longer. But do the mortality tables give us this postulated
information? By no means. They give us only the average of
the years beyond 46 years, through what those who have attained
that age have survived. But that average is possibly not the
period of survival of any single person. Let us suppose that we
have known but two persons A and B to pass beyond 46 years.
Of these ages one lived to be 47, the other to be 67. The combined
excess is 22 years, the average is 11. The question is, how long
will C, now 46, live. Could we safely say that he will live 11
years? Is there any appreciable probability that he will live 11
years? A has not lived so many. B has lived nearly twice as
many. Why should C be supposed destined to live to the median
point? Let us suppose we have had experience of six lives of
persons who have survived 46. A has lived one year, B 2 years, C
9 years, D 11 years, E 13 years, and F 14 years. The combined
excesses beyond 46, are 50 years, the average excess is 8.33 years.
The question is , how long will a seventh man, G, who has reached
the age of 46, live. Have we any warrant for thinking that he
will live 8.33 years? Not one of his predecessors has lived that
time; not one has struck the average. What reason is there for
suspecting, much less for believing, that he will attain that aver-
age ? As half his predecessors, he may fall short of it; as half
his predecessors, he may transcend it. The same infirmity
would attach to a vaticination founded on the experience of
1000, or of 10,000, or of 100,000 lives. If we know that the aver-
age excess beyond 46, attained by those who reach 46, is 23.8
years, we have not the slightest warrant for supposing that the
100,001st man, who reaches 46, will live just 23.8 years more.
Not more than ten of the 100,000 struck that average. All the
rest have fallen within it or beyond it. Why then guess that this
100,001st man is going to repeat what but one in 10,000 has done?
It is not only not probable, it is excessively improbable, that the
candidate for future years is going to live the average time.
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Perhaps, in the long run as many men have lived beyond
the average, as have fallen below it. But does the fact that half
have lived the average and more, justify the inference, in any
particular case, that X will live at least that average? If 99 men
out of a hundred, are sane, we will be justified in thinking that
any particular man, of whose sanity we know nothing, is sane.
The burden of proving that he is insane, would, even in a criminal
prosegution of him, rest upon the party alleging it. But, suppose
one half of all men were insane and the other half sane, with
what cogency could it be believed of any particular man, of
whose sanity nothing was directly known, that he was-sane? It
would seem then, that knowing the average age ultimately attain-
ed by those who have already reached a certain age,would be of
no appreciable valie, in attempting to ascertain what age X, who
has already reached that certain age, will ultimately reach.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF AVERAGE AGE.
Notwithstanding the objections to evidence that men of a
certain age have reached ages, the averag of which is so and so,
as a means of ascertaining to what age X, a particular man,
would have lived, or will live, its competence has been recognized
by many courts and for a long period of time.
CONSIDERATIONS LESSENING VALUE OF EVIDENCE.
The weakness of the average, as a means of ascertaining how
long a particular person is going to live,or would, but for the
accident, or crime, have lived, is already indicated. He may not
attain that average. "A man" says Paxson, C.J. "may die in a
day, or he may live [to earn wages] for 20 years. It follows that
there must always be an element of uncertainty in every such
case." 4' White, J. told the jury that the plaintiff, who had suf-
fered an injury which reduced his earning power, "may live to be
90 or he may die at 21."' 45 When it appears that at 47 the expec-
tancy of life is 23 years, "that does not mean to say that a man
is going to live 23 years. He may die the next day; he may live
to be ninety."4
SUFFICIENTLY VALUABLE, DESPITE OBJECTIONS.
The court frequently insists that the average age attained
is unsatisfactory, as evidence of the age which X would have
"Steinbrunner v. Railway Co.; 146 P. 504.
*'Rummele v. Heating Co., 2 Monaghan, 98.
"Emery v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 492.
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attained or will attain. "It is far from satisfactory evidence,"
says Mitchell, C.J.47
DANGER OF THE EVIDENCE.
The evidence of average age is considered dangerous, be-
cause of the tendency of juries to readily assume that the person
in question would have reached, or will reach, that average.
4 8
INDICATIONS THAT LESS THAN THE AVERAGE WILL PROBABLY
BE ATTAINED.
There are certain facts which indicate that less than the
average longevity will be attained in the particular case. If the
average is that of all persons without regard to their health the
existence of certain life-shortening sicknesses in the case of X
may justify the opinion that X will not reach the average age.
"If a man is in poor health," says Paxson, C.J. "especially if he
is suffering from some organic disease which necessarily tends
to shorten life, his expectancy is much less that that of a man of
robust health. '49 Hence it is relevant to show by the testimony of
a physician, or otherwise, that the man, whose probable longevity
is in question, was, at the time of the accident, afflicted with
Bright's disease and to refer to the jury the effect of the disease
upon his probable length of life.50
HABITS.
A man may have habits at the time of his injury or death,
that would be likely to continue, and that, if continued, would
probably shorten his life. The value of the average age as
evidence will, in the particular case, says Paxson, C. J. depend
very much on the "habits of life" of the person in question.5 '
That a man was frequently intoxicated, may doubtless be shown,
to lessen the probability of his attaining the age given in the
Carlisle table,52 though in a case' in which a man died from in-
"Campbell v. C'ty of York, 172 Pa. 205.
"Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504; Kerrigan v. Pa. R. R.
194 Pa. 98.
"Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504; Mansfield Coal Co. v.
McEnery, 91 Pa. 185; Campbell v. City of York, 172 Pa. 205.
'Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363. Evidence by the plaintiff that his
disease was the result of the accident could be receivable. That deceased
had varicose veins was shown in Hunn v. Michigan C. R. R. 44 N.W. 502.
"Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504; Seifred v. Penna. R. R.
206 Pa. 399.
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ebriation, the admissibility of the Carlisle table was doubted.53
SOCIAL SURROUNDINGS.
The social surroundings of a man, if likely to continue, may
abridge his life,and therefore, may be shown."
CARE WITH WHICH TABLES SHOULD BE USED.
Reference is frequently made to the care with which the
tables of mortality should be submitted to the jury =5 Paxson,
C.J. in 1891 though of opinion that the evidence could not be
excluded, claimed to be allowed to "express the fear that it may
prove a dangerous element in this class of cases, unless the at-
tention of juries is pointedly called to the other questions which
affect it."6 But what are the questions that affect it? One would
be as to the care with which the computations of the tables and
the observations on which they are based,were made. But the jury
has never been invited to consider such questions. The only
other relevant question arises out of the fact that the table gives
only an average, and that in no particular case, is there any
likelihood that the average would have been or will be, exactly
reached. This is occasionally commented on. Thus Stow, P.J.
told the jury, "one may die to-day, another to-morrow, and anoth-
er the next day, **** and therefore it does not do to assume that
I am going to live that long." In Kerrigan v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co.,57 Dean, J. remarks that "Experience has demonstrated
however, that what was merely apprehended by Paxson, C.J.
has since (i.e. in 1899, eight years) been realized." How this
could have occurred it is difficult to see, for not a single case
was in the supreme court, between 1891 and 1899, in which the
average age as indicated by tables, was employed, that was not
affirmed.58 The ouly specific objection to the instruction of the
'Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304; 2 N.W. 715; Kerig v. Bell, 14 N.W.
141 (Neb.).
'Rafferty v. Buckman, 46 Ia. 195. "The tables" says the court "were
made to show the ordinary prospect and no other," but the habits of the
deceased deprived him "of the ordinary prospect of life." The Carlisle
table was not made to show the "ordinary prospect."
"146 Pa. 204; 206 Pa. 399.
'McKenna v. Gas Co., 198 Pa. 31.
'Steinbrunner v. Railway Co., 146 Pa. 504.
"194 Pa. 98.
zDooner v. Canal Co., 164 Pa. 17; was reversed, but tables were not
used in it.
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court in Kerrigan's case, is that the habits and health of the deceas-
ed were not proved, and that the court's language might have left
the jury under the impression that the tables were not only "some
evidence of the plaintiff's expectancy but that they established it."
Dean, J. proceeds to say that they were not entitled to such weight,
unless, by precedent proof he had brought himself clearly within
the class of selected lives tabulated; i.e., the table being based on
insurable lives, unless the plaintiff had proved that his life was
insurable.-9 It seems enough then, for the court to pointedly
show to the jury that, knowing the average age to which men
generally live is not knowing the age to which the person in
question would have lived, or will live; to insist on evidence
of health, habits, social relations, and to instruct the jury as to
the significance of those facts, with regard to probable longevity.
Commending the trial judge, Potter, J. says60 "But the jury were
not left to infer that the plaintiff's expectancy of life was defin-
itely established by the tables. On the contrary, the trial judge
in his charge, told the jury that the result set forth in the table
was not to be taken as a fact in this case, but only as an aid in
arriving at what might be the continuation of life of the plaintiff.
Attention was called to the absolute uncertainty of life, and the
fact that in any event the duration of her life would depend
largely upon her conditiori of health and upon her habits and
her conduct." The trial judge was commended in Campbell v. City
of York61 for having been governed in his instructions, by the
decision in Steinbrunner v. Railroad Co. and other cases, when
he in substance told the jury that the Carlisle tables were based
on insurable lives, (they were not) on people who had passed a
medical examination; at 47, the expectancy is 23 years, but that
does not mean that a man who is 47 is going to live 23 years
longer. He may die the next day; he may live to be ninety.
The duration of any particular life cannot be predicted. It will
depend largely upon his health, upon his acts and conduct, upon
the liability to contract disease, and matters of that sort. "I
'In Emery v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 492, Mitchell, C.J. says that the
restriction under which the tables should be received and submitted to
the jury are clearly and authoritatively set forth by our Brother Dean
in Kerrigan v. R. E. Co.,and see also McKenna v. Citizens Nat. Gas Co.,
198 Pa. 31.
'Iseminger v. Water & Power Co., 209 Pa. 615.
"1172 Pa. 205.
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say this because I do not want you to assume that because the
expectancy of life at 47 years is 23 years, that this man will live
23 years. He may live twice that; he may die tomorrow." In
Seifred v. Pennsylvania Railroad,0 2 Mestrezat, J. says that "It
is not sufficient to say, as the court did, that the tables were some
aid, but not conclusive in determining the probable life of the
plaintiff. All the circumstances affecting the probable duration of
the plaintiff's life as disclosed by the evidence or concerning
which there was testimony, should have been called to the at-
tention of the jury. Unless this was done and in a very pointed
and direct way, by the court, mortality tables are very likely to
have more weight with the jury than should be given evidence
of that character."
USE OF TABLES UNNECESSARY.
The mortality table is not the only evidence from which
the probable length of life of X, may be inferred. A legitimate
inference of it may be made although the table is not offered."2
In an action for the death of a husband, the supreme court of
Virginia said that it was unnecessary to put in evidence the
"mortality tables." "Those tables were made for the purpose of
life insurance and annuities, where the very shortest time is fixed
as affecting pecuniary risks. They are regarded as falling
short in most instances, of the actual duration of human life."'6 4
A plaintiff, mother of the deceased, suing for his death, did not
put in evidence of her probable length of life by the testimony of
experts in the life insurance business. The court said the jury
might conclude from her age, and physical condition, what her
longevity would probably be.65 In Dooner v. Canal Co. 6 a man
30 years of age suffered an injury. He furnished.no evidence
explicitly upon his probable duration of life. It apparently ap-
peared that he was in good health. The trial court's observation
to the jury that they would probably be warranted in acting upon
the rule that a man in good health will live to the ordinary age of
65 or 70 years, was censured by Dean, J., who remarked, doubtless
after consulting the mortality tables, that the average expec-
tancy of life of 1000 men in good health at 30 years of age
'206 Pa. 399.
'Haines v. Pearson, 75 S.W. 194.
'Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Phillips' Adm. 41 S.E. 726.
'Gulf etc. R. R. v. Compton (Texas) 13 S.W. 677.
'164 Pa. 17.
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falls short of 35 to 40 years more. "Without referring to care-
fully compiled life-tables, any man 65 years of age, from his
own observation, will hesitate to say that at 30, the probability of
suvivorship is 35 or 40 years longer. In looking back 35 years
to his acquaintances of that period whose age then, was about
the same as his own, he will realize that he has survived a large
majority of them and that no such probability is to be deduced
from his own observation. It may be there is such probability as
to this plaintiff's life, but if so, we have failed to discover any
evidence in this record tending to establish it. Without evidence
of such a probability, the adoption of it, as suggested to the jury
by the court, was an error." The error was not in allowing the
jury, in the absence of the table, to determine the probable
longevity but in suggesting a longevity which there was no evi-
dence to support. In Catawissa Railroad Co. v. Armstrong, 7
a widow recovered damages for the death of her husband, although
no table was in evidence. The jury might consider his age (40
years), and the fact that he was in good health. Whether the
long life of the ancestor can be shown has been variously decided.
It was admitted to show that the deceased would probably have
lived longer than the average indicated by the table"8 or to show
the probable length of life, in the absence of the table.69
"52 Pa. 282. In Emory v. Philadelphia; 208 Pa. 492, a widow recovered
for the loss of her husband, although no table indicating her probable
longevity was put in evidence.
"Nelson v. Lake Shore etc. R. R. (Mich.) 62 N.W. 993.
"Rincicotti v. Contracting Co., 77 Conn. 617; Chattanooga R. R. v.
Clowores 90 Ga. 258, Contra; Hinsdale v. N. Y. etc. R. R. 81 N. Y..Supp.
356, where it is said that evidence that the father lived to be 72 years
old, was "too speculative."
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MOOT COURT.
ADMINISTRATOR OF SOLOWAY vs. JOHN TATE.
Donatio causa mortLs. Delivery of Personalty to Third Person.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Solloway fatally ill asked his attorney how he might effectually dispose
of his personal property without a will. The attorney advised him that he
might make a gift of it causa mortis, but-that delivery would be necessary.
Solloway then drew up a list of the articles: a safe, a piano, a gold watch,
silver plates, etc. and a list of the respective donees, the names of the lat-
ter being set opposite those of the former.
He then put the articles and the list in the possession of the
attorney with directions that the latter should hand them to the respective
donees at Solloway's death.
After Solloway's death, before delivery to the donees, the adminis-
tator brought replevin against the Attorney John Tate.
CooK, for Plaintiff.
GROVER, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KING J.-Gifts causa mortis are said to be a sort of off-shoot of the
right to make oral testaments of chattels, enjoyed at common law, which
have survived the statutory prohibition of verbal wills.
To be valid, they must be made by the donor in expectation of death
from a present illness, or from a present, external,and apprehended
peril, and death must accordingly ensue of the particular ailment or peril
without revocation; the gift must be conditioned to take effect only upon
the death of the donor, from his then existing disorder or apprehended
peril; and it is revoked by the death of the donee in the lifetime of the
donor. The conditions attending such gifts, namely, that the donor may
revoke them, and that they are revoked by his recovery or by the pre-
decease of the donee, need not be expressed, being always implied.
Three essentials must appear in every valid donatio causa mortis:
(1) the gift must be with a view to the donor's death; (2) there must be
an express or implied intention that the gift should only take effect on the
donor's decease by his existing disorder; (3) and there must be a delivery
of the subject-matter of the donation to the donee, or to some one on his
behalf. Since it has been found as a fact that Solloway was "fatally ill"
dying of his then existing disorder, and that Solloway expressly directed
Tate to deliver over the property on his demise, the first two requisites
are seen to have been fulfilled.
But it is contended that the third essential-delivery-is lacking.
The Court is of the opinion, however, that a sufficient delivery was made.
In Well's administration of Craig v. Tucker, 3 Binney 366, the
action was trover against defendants to whom two bonds had been deliv-
ered by the widow of the deceased after his death. The court said: "The
delivery was not to the donee but to the donee's wife to be by her
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delivered over. There is no objection to this mode of delivery. Whether
made to the donee immediately, or to another for his use, is immaterial."
Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. 59, was assumpsit brought by the donees against
the administrator of the donor who had received and converted the
property. In this case, there was a delivery of gold dust and coin to the
purser of the ship by a seaman for his brother and sister in Philadelphia.
It was held; "Delivery was indespensible, but whether made to the donee
immediately, or to another for him, was held immaterial."
It will be noticed that the cases hold that the final delivery-delivery
to the donee himself-may take place either before or after the donor's
death. And if the donor can invest the legal title in someone else for
the use of the donee, a fortiori lie may make a voluntary declaration of
trust and hold the property himself for the donee. Thus in Austin v.
Mead, Brett's Leading Cases in Equity, American ed. 212, it appeared
that Mead had in his possession two bills of exchange, payable to him-
self or order, and that two days before his death he had handed them,
unindorsed, to his wife. There was no transfer of the legal title to the
bills, but there was language coupled with the conduct, viz. the delivery of
the bills, which was equivalent to a declaration that the donor was a
trustee for the donee, and a trust enforceable against the personal repre-
sentatives of the donor was created.
In the present case, Solloway "put the articles and the list specifying
as to whom they should go" into the possession of Tate. The subject-
matter and the beneficiary are designated with legal certainty, and a
present intention to part with both the possession and the property in
the things given was shown. This was sufficient to constitute a valid
delivery. And since some of the articles were heavy and cumbersome,
not admitting of actual delivery oOssibly to Tate under varying circum-
stances, the delivery of the list only, accompanied by a parol declaration,
would have been a sufficient manifestation of Solloway's intention.
Such declaration, with a writing clearly designating the property and the
beneficiaries, would be an assignment by the giving over of the best
evidence which the nature of the articles admit of. The reason why the
delivery was invalid in Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177, was that no assign-
ment in or without the book was made of the fund claimed as a donatio
by the mere handing of the deposit book to another for the donee. The
property being in possession of one other than the donor, no legal or
equitable title became vested. Under the same circumstances, the gift or
delivery would have been good if the property had been in the possession
of the 'donor.
No creditors of Solloway appearing to set aside the gift, the same
was a valid donatio causa mortis, and replevin by the administrator does
not lie. Judgment is hereby directed to be entered for the defendant
that the distribution such as was intended and manifested by the donor
may be made.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The opinion of the learned court of common pleas sufficiently supports
the judgment. The possession of the articles was given to the attorney, in
order that he might deliver them, after the donor's death, to the designated
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beneficiaries. The donor retained no power over them. The attorney
became a trustee for the donees; 20 Cyc. 1232. All the qualities of a valid
donatio mortis causa inhere in the transaction.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH vs. JONES.
Homiide-Intent-Malice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Jones being a boarder in the house of Gibson, told Gibson, his land-
lord not to go near his trunk and try to open it, as he had fixed a spring
gun so that one opening it would be killed. Gibson attempted to open
and force the trunk.and was killed. Lower court gave a verdict of murder
against Jones for murder. This is an appeal.
MCWHINNEY for Commonwealth.
ZERBY for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DAY, J.-The question before the court is whether the facts of this
case will support a verdict of murder. To determine this we must con-
consider the elements that are essential to make a homicide murder, and
what ones are essential for the crime of manslaughter; and then apply
them to the facts and circumstances of the case before us.
Murder, by the statute in Pa. (Act. Mar. 31, 1860) has been divided
into murder of the first and second degree. The statute provides that:-
"All murder that shall be perpetrated by means of poison or by lying in
wait or by any other means of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,
or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to per-
petrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of
the first degree, and all other kinds shall be deemed murder of the second
degree."
As the killing in the case before us was not in the perpetration of
or attempt to perpetrate any of the four enumerated felonies, to hold
the prisoner guilty of first degree murder we must find that the killing
was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated. "The intention to kill is the
essence of the offense. Therefore if an intention to kill exists, it is
wilful, if the intention be accompanied by such circumstances as to evi-
dence a mind fully conscious of its own..purpose and design, it is delib-
erate; and if a sufficient time be afforded the mind fully to frame the
design to kill and to select the instrument or to frame the plan to carry
the design into execution, it is premeditated." Com. v. Drum 58 Pa. 9.
As the statute provides that all other murder shall be murder of the
second degree, it is necessary for us to go to the Common Law to discover
what constitutes murder of the second degree. At common law murder
is described to be when a person of sound memory and discretion unlaw-
fully kills any reasonable creature in being, and under the peace of the
commonwealth, with malice aforethought expressed or implied. Malice
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aforethought comprehends not only a particular will, but every case
where there is wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, reck-
lessness of consequnce, and a mind regardleess of 'social duty, although a
particular person may not be intended to be injured. Murder therefore at
common law embraces cases where no intention to kill exists but where the
state of mind termed legal malice in its legal sense prevails. (Trickett's
Pa. Law of Crimes 837). Second degree murder includes all unlawful
killing under circumstances of depravity of heart and a disposition of
mind regardless of social duty; but where no intention to kill. exists or
can be reasonably and fully inferred. Therefore in all cases of murder
if no intention to kill can be inferred or collected from the circumstances
the verdict must be second degree murder. (Com. v. Drum.) In determ-
ining whether a homicide is murder of the second degree, it is necessary
to discover that there was malice and that there was no intention to kill,
and that the killing did not result from the perpetration of any of the four
felonies. (Trickett's Pa. Criminal Law, 818.)
Manslaughter is defined to be the unlawful killing of another without
malice expressed or implied; which may be voluntary in sudden heat or
involuntary but in the commission of an unlawful act. The difference
between manslaughter and murder is this :-manslaughter is never attended
by legal malice or depravity of heart, that condition or frame of mind
before spoken of, exhibiting wickedness of disposition, recklessnes of
consequence, or cruelty. To reduce an -intentional blow or stroke, or
wounding resulting in death to voluntary manslaughter, there must be
sufficient cause of provocation and a state of rage or passion, without
time to cool, placing the prisoner beyond the control of his reason and
suddenly impelling him to the deed. If any of these be wanting;--if there
be provocation without passion, or passion without sufficient cause of
provocation or there be time to cool and reason has resumed its sway,
the killing will be murder. (Comm. v. Drum.)
Having set forth the elements of the various homicides, before we
apply them to the case before us we must determine what effect the fact
that Gibson was a trespasser and had knowledge of -the danger had upon
the act of Jones.
In 14 Conn. 1, L.R.A. Vol. 29 p. 153, the court held "that one who
proposes doing an unlawful act, by which the life of a fellow being may
be taken, can not excuse himself from the consequences thereof by giving
notice of his evil intent, or of the danger which he himself has created,
and this is true although the person killed thereby may have received notice
and was a trespasser at the time of the injury." In 31 Am. Dec. 306, it was
held a person is not permitted for the protection of his property in his
absence, against a mere trespasser, to use means endangering the life or
safety of a human being, whatever he may do, whether the entry on his
premises is to commit a felony or a breach of the peace.
The wrong or guilt of the trespasser or thief if not such as to
justify the injury if inflicted directly cannot be justified because inflicted
indirectly and by the assistance of the wrong doer. If the defendant could
not, if present, have discharged the gun which he placed in his shop, by
his own-agency, against a thief who had broken and entered for the pur-
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pose of stealing, he could not place and leave it there so that the thief
if he entered would discharge the gun against himself. (31 Conn. 479.)
The Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law vol. 21 p. 153 holds :--"A homicide
may be murder when it is committed by the indirect use of deadly agencies
such as spring guns and other coiltrivances set or laid on premises whereby
trespassers may be killed or seriously injured. The degree of criminality
is to be determined in such cases in the main by the same consideration
that would have applied had the accused struck the blow with his own
hands."
From the above cases we think it is plain that Jones can not excuse
himself by showing that Gibson was a trespasser at the time he was killed
and had notice of the danger. Jones would have had no right to kill him
if he had been present, and he can not do indirectly what he was not
justified in doing directly.
We learned that all unlawful killing, with malice, was murder; and all
unlawful killing without malice was manslaughter. To determine to which
class Jones' crime belongs we must find whether the killing was with mal-
ice, expressed or implied or without malice. We think the act of Jones in
placing the gun in his trunk in such a manner as to cause death to any per-
son lifting the lid, showed such a wickedness of disposition, recklessness of
consequences, and a mind so regardless of social duty, as to show legal
malice in the killing. This is sufficient to make the crime murder.
To determine the degree of murder it is necssary for us to find
whether it was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, or only malicious
killing without the intent nicessary to make it first degree. Jones had no
intention to kill Gibson as he gave him notice of the danger; he may have
even hoped that no person would be caught in his trap. But even if we
hold that he had a general intent to kill whoever opened his trunk, we
think it could not be construed to be wilful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder within the meaning of the statute. Therefore we hold the facts
of this case will support a verdict of second degree murder.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The defendant told Gibson that he had fixed a spring gun in his trunk
so, that one opening it would be killed. From this might be inferred that
he intended, not simply that the gun should be discharged, if one attempted
to open the trunk, not simply that its contents should enter the body of
such a one, but that such a one should be killed by them.
That Jones had no right to prevent the inspection of the contents of
the trunk by means of the death of the curious person, or their theft by
means of the death of the intending thief, hardly needs explicit assertion.
A man can defend himself from grave bodily injury, and cause the death
of the aggressor in doing so; he may exclude an intruder from his house
by force that shall be fatal to the intruder, if the need of so much force
is necessary. But he cannot prevent all species of inteference with his
property by conduct so drastic. It does nut appear that Gibson intended
to steal anything found in the trunk. He may have been actuated by
mere curiosity. The spring-gun discharges itself, when a certain move-
ment occurs, without respect to the motive or ultimate intention of the
person who originates the movement. If the intention of Jones can be
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descried in his act, it must have been to kill persons who opened the
trunk, when their purpose was simply to discover what was in it; as well
as when their purpose was to steal it,
The willingness to cause the death or grave bodily harm of a person
simply to prevent his seeing things, must be deemed malice. If the killing
of Gibson was done by Jones, it was a malicious killing, that is a murder.
Was it done by Jones? It is not necessary that Jones should have done
the last act done by an intelligent agency, in order to justify his being
deemed the doer. A may put a gun into B's hands and direct B to shoot
X. B's shooting will be deemed A's shooting. A may put poison into B's
hands with direction that B shall swallow it. Although the swallowing is
B's act, and is done with knowledge that the thing swallowed is poison,
the poisoning is attributed to A.
The setting of the gun within the trunk did not alone cause the
shooting. Not followed by the effort to open the trunk, it would not have
shot anyone. Gibson's act was necessary to. the discharge. If Gibson,
taking advantage of the situation made by Jones, had opened the trunk in
order that he might shoot and kill himself, we should hesitate to say that
Jones might be deemed causally related to the death. So far as appears,
Gibson did not b~lieve that there was a gun in the trunk, or he did not
believe that, though there was, it would shoot him if he opened the trunk.
He did not consciously concur with Jones' wish. On the contrary it
was clear that Jones desired that he should not tamper with the trunk.
But since Gibson's act was done, not with the intention to cause his death,
but in disbelief that it would cause his death, we think Jones may be
said to have caused the death. When A produces a situation from which
he knows and intends that, if B does a certain act, B's death will result,
and B does that act expecting, desiring or intending that result. A may
justly be deemed the author of it.
As then Jones arranged the gun with the knowledge and intention
that one attempting to open the trunk, would, thereby discharge it into
himself and kill himself, he is guilty of murder.
State v. Marfaudille, (Wash.) 92 Pac. 939, is not inconsistant with
this view. A conviction of murder of the second degree was disapproved
because the statute of that state requiring "both malice and intent" to con-
stitute murder of the second degree, there was no proof of the existence
of such intent.
That one who by a spring gun set in his garden to prevent depre-
dations upon it, causes the death of a depredator may be guilty of crim-
inal homicide, is affirmed in Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1. In State v.
Moore, 31 Conn. 479, it is said that one who sets a spring-gun to prevent
the consummation of a burglary, is not guilty of the death of a burglar,
who in breaking into the building, is shot, although if the gun were so
arranged that it might, if discharged, shoot persons innocently passing on
a highway, the maintenance of it might be a criminal nusiance. A goose
house was put under the protection of this principle in United States v.
Gilliam, 1 Hayw & H. 109; and a warehouse containing valuable property,
in Gray v. Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh, 478. But it is only when the placing of
the gun is intended to prevent an act which is deemed specially bad and
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dangerous, such as arson, murder, burglary, etc., that an ensuing death is
a non-malicious killing.
Judgment affirmed.
AMOS JERROLD vs. THOMAS EMMONS.
Contract-Acceptance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Emmons ordered a suit of clothes from Jerrold, a tailor. The goods
were selected, Emmons' measure was taken. The clothes were to be sent
to his house, and he was to try them on. Any necessary changes were to
be made by Jerrold. The clothes were to be accepted and paid for, when
satisfactory to Emmons. The price was $40. The clothes were made
tried on and certain changes suggested by Emmons. Jerrold was to send
for them from Emmons' residence, to make the changes. Before he did so
(the next day) a fire occured in Emmons' house which destroyed the
clothes. This is an action for the $40.
MAUCH for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
McCLINTOCK, Judge.-
Emmons, the defendant, entered into a contract with Jerrold, the
plaintiff, for a suit of clothes, to cost when completed, $40. The tailor
was to make a suite and send it to Emmons' house, and if it was not sat-
isfactory, to make any necessary alterations. When the suit was deliv-
ered, it was not entirely satisfactory. Accordingly Jerrold was to send for
it, make some changes, and then it was to be accepted and paid for. Be-
fore he sent for the suit, the next day,-Emmons' house burnt, destroying
the clothes.
A bailment for mutual benefit was here created. The benefit to the
tailor was his expected payment for the suit; to Emmons, the ownership of
the new suit. Th6 law does not determine the adequacy of the considera-
tion. That is left to the parties to the contract, who are the sole judges
of the benefits and advantages to be derived from the contract.
Hale on Bailment, 10 Gray, 366.
A bailment of this class may exist when the workman furnishes the
materials and preforms the work on them. The contract is in that case
entire, and he cannot recover until the work is completed. If the thing
perishes, lie must bear the loss. "Res peit domino." Goddard's Outlines
of Bailment ,pp. 52 and 53.
When Jerrold sent the suite to Emmons, the bailment became a locatio
custodiae, for which, as this is a bailment for mutual benefit, ordinary
care is required. No negligence is imputed to the defendant, and he can not
be held liable on that ground. The negligence, if any, is with the plaintiff,
for not sending for the suit before.
The work was not completed, and therefore title had not passed to
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the defendant when the suit was destroyed. He had not accepted and paid
for it.
In as much as the suit was unfinished, altho in Emmons' house to be
tried on, and as the bailment still existed, and as no negligence is imputed
to the defendant, the plaintiff can not recover.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The contract between these parties was that the clothes were to be
made, sent to Emmons' house, there tried on; if necessary, altered so as to
become satisfactory to him. They were in fact sent to his house, but
being tried on, were found to need some alterations. Emmons was not
bound to keep them, in that state. They had not became his, by being
made, or sent, or tried on. Acceptance by Emmons or facts operating
as would acceptance, must occur, in order to make them his. Tiffany,
Sales, (2 Ed.) 160. He did not accept them. He did not retain them an
undue time, so as to forbid his denying that he had accepted them. They
may have been received late in the evening of the day prior to that on
which the fire occurred, and the fire may have destroyed them early the
next morning. No court would properly allow a jury to say that in so
short a time, the right of refusal of the clothes had been lost.
The risk of loss generally attaches to the ownership of the goods;
Tiffany, Sales (2d Ed.) 141. No negligence of Emmons appears, to
make him responsible for the destruction of the clothes. He is not an
insurer of goods of others found in his house, nor, in particular of these
clothes.
Neither then as buyer who has accepted the goods, nor as buyer whose
negligence has caused the destruction of them while they were in his
custody, preliminary to his decision to accept them, is Emmons liable
for the $40 their value.
Judgment affirmed.
CORNMAN vs. WALKER
Breach of Contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Walker contracted to deliver to Cornman 1000 bushels of wheat on
Nov. 1st, 1908, at 95 cents per bushel. On October 1st, Cornman received
a notice from Walker that he would not be able to perform his contract.
Cornman on October 15th, bought elsewhere 500 bushels at 90 cents per
bushel, and on November 1st he bought 500 bushels at $1.00 per bushel.
The general market price charged for wheat by dealers on November 1st
was $1.02 per bushel, but Cornman received his from a neighbor at $1.00
per bushel.
This is assumpsit for non-delivery. Walker contends that Cornman
has suffered no damage.
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COLLINS for Plaintiff.
BELL for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
McCLINTOCK, J.-It is conceded in this case that there was a valid
contract between the litigants and that there was a non-performanace by
Walker, who notified plaintiff a month before delivery of the wheat that
he would be unable to perform. Cornman elected to treat the contract as
broken from the date of this notice, as evidenced by his immediate pur-
chase of half the amount of wheat contracted for. This he had a right
to do, for it has been declared by the Supreme Court of this and other
states that upon notice by one party of an intention not to preform, the
other may treat the contract as broken and may bring suit at once or may
wait until the expiration of the time as expressed by the contract.
Hubbard v. Borden, 6 Wharton 79; Hampton v. Specknagle, 9 S. & R.
212; Zuch v. McClure, 98 Pa. 541.
Having concluded that the contract was broken by the defendant and
such breach was acted upon by the plaintiff, the next question is what
damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to?
The general rule as to the measure of damages is the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market value at the time and place of
delivery, in other words, compensation in money for the actual loss sustaiii-
ed. But this is a very general rule and is subject to exceptions. Kuntz. v.
Kirkpatrick & Lyons, 72 Pa. 376; Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 Dallas 206. The
market value of a commodity for which one person is responsible to
another is its value to the latter. Burns v. Brown, 130 N. Y. 372;. Com-
monwealth v. Allen, 30 Pa. 49; Stauffer v. Miller, 151 Pa. 330. In applying
this general rule as to breaches of contracts, the party sustaining the loss
is to be placed, in so far as money can do it, in the position he would
have occupied had the contract been preformed. 8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 545.
The rule is to give actual compensation, by graduating the amount of
damages exactly to the extent of the loss. Forsyth v. Palmer, 14 Pa. 97.
As soon as he received notice, the plaintiff purchased five hundred
bushels at ninety cents, which was five cents less than the contract price,
and later purchased the remaining five hundred bushels at a dollar, or
five cents above the .contract price. So, the price paid was exaL.y the
price to be paid under the contract, and there was no actual loss sustained.
Cornman is in exactly the same position he would have been in had the
contract been preformed.
In Theiss v. Weiss, 166 Pa. 9, when the plaintiff endeavored to recover
damages for the non-delivery of goods contracted for, the court said that
the damages should be measured by the difference between the contract
price and the real price for which he obtained the goods which the plaintiff
failed to deliver. In as much as there has been no actual loss and the
plaintiff is in precisely the same position he would have occupied upon
performance, the only question to be considered is whether or not nominal
damages can be awarded.
As soon as he discovered the fact that he would be unable to make the
delivery, Walker notified the plaintiff, thus giving him a month in which
to secure the wheat elsewhere, which was done. In doing this he was
acting fairly, honorably and equitably in giving Cornman an opportunity
to treat the contract as at an end and to go elsewhere for his wheat,
so as to sustain no loss. In view of all this it would be unjust and
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inequitable to impose damages upon the defendant for his actions, which
were all that could be expected-and to allow anything to Cornman, who
has appeared to have suffered no loss at all. Therefore this court decides
in favor of Walker.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
That Walker's notice to Cornman that he would not perform his
contract, justified Cornman in obtaining wheat elsewhere cannot be doubt-
ed. Nor did Cornman's obtaining wheat elsewhere so far discharge the
contract, as to exempt Walker from liability for damages. The question
is what damages have been suffered.
It does not distinctly appear that the wheat purchased by Cornman
on October 15th and on November 1st, was purchased as a substitute for
that which Walker should have delivered to him. It is conceivable that
Cornman acquiesed in Walker's retraction of his contract, and that his sub-
sequent purchases had no reference to that contract. We shall assume
however, that the latter purchases were made to take the place of the one
previously made from Walker.
It is clear then that on the purchase of October 15th there was no
loss; but a gain. On the purchase 'of November 1st there was a loss of
five cents per bushel. Can this loss be recovered? We think not. The
contract was a unit, and if both purchases, i.e. that of October 15th and
that of November 1st were made in order to supply the default of Walker,
they must be combined, and if thus combined, there is no loss, no loss can
be recovered for.
The market price for wheat on November 1st was $1.02 per bushel,
but Cornman obtained the 500 bushels for $1.00 per bushel. We do not
think he can insist on obtaining as damages the difference between
95 cents and $1.02.
The learned court below has directed a verdict for the defendant. It
is clear, we think, that Cornman has suffered no money loss, no substan-
tial damages. It does not follow that he was not entitled to nominal
damages. "Nominal damages, at least, should be recovered for breach
of contract." 3 Page, Contracts, 2393. "Nominal damages may be recov-
ered even if it is shown affirmatively that the party complaining of the
breach was gainer and not a loser by reason of such breach." Id. 2393.
"A failure to preform a duty or contract is a legal wrong, independlent
of actual damages to the party for whose benefit the performance of
such duty or contract is due. The omission to show actual damages and tile
inference therefrom that none have been sustained, do not necessaidly
render the case trivial." 1 Sutherland, Damages 31. "The act complqjic-
of may produce no actual injury; it may be in fact beneficial by adding
to the value of the property or by averting a loss which would otherwise
have happened, yet it will be equally true in law and in fact that it was
in itself injurious if violative of a legal right." 1 Sutherland, Damages, 27.
When Walker announced his intention to repudiate his contractual duty, he
he could at once have been sued, and nominal damages could have been
recovered. He did a wrong, for which the good fortune of Cornman in
subsequently obtaining wheat at no greater price, was no atonement.
The learned court should have directed the jury to allow nominal
damages.
